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By Goodwin Liu
Assistant Professor of Law, Boalt Hall
School of Law, and Co-Director, Chief
Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race,
Ethnicity and Diversity, University of
California, Berkeley. This paper is adapted
from a December 2006 article in New
York University Law Review.
Any serious effort by the federal gov-ernment to improve equality of edu-cational opportunity must confront a
sobering and often neglected fact: Funding
gaps among states are even larger than fund-
ing gaps within states. In 2003-04, the ten
highest spending states spent an average of
more than 50 percent more dollars per pupil
than was spent by the lowest spending ten
states. Low-spending states are clustered in
the South, Southwest, and West, and serve a
disproportionate share of the nation’s poor
children.
The purpose of Title I of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act is to level the
educational playing field for poor children.
Given this ambition, one would expect Title I
to disproportionately benefit low-spending
states, where low-income students are
concentrated. But the reality is otherwise.
Wealthier, higher-spending states receive a
disproportionate share of Title I funds,
thereby exacerbating the profound
differences in education spending from state
to state. Title I makes rich states richer and
leaves poor states behind.
The problem lies in the Title I formulas.
Under the three main formulas (basic,
concentration, and targeted grants), each
state’s Title I allocation is largely a product of
two factors. The first is the number and
concentration of poor children in the school
districts of each state. This factor benefits
poorer states because they have
disproportionate numbers of low-income
children. But the second factor is the average
per-pupil expenditure in the state. This state
expenditure factor means that high-spending
states get more Title I money per poor child
than low-spending states. The net effect is
that Title I does not reduce, but rather
reinforces, inequality among states.
As Table 1 shows, interstate differences in
Title I allocations are not small. Column A
lists the number and percentage of the
nation’s poor children in each state in 2003,
and column B lists each state’s share of Title I
funds in 2003. Together, columns A and B
show that states do not receive Title I money
in proportion to their shares of the nation’s
low-income children. Maryland, for example,
had fewer poor children than Arkansas but
received 51 percent more Title I aid per poor
child. Massachusetts had fewer low-income
children than Oklahoma but received more
than twice as much Title I aid per poor child.
Similarly, Minnesota had fewer poor children
than New Mexico but received 27 percent
more Title I aid per poor child. 
Column C shows each state’s Title I
funding per poor child in rank order. The
amounts per poor child at the top are as
much as double the amounts at the bottom,
with the variation essentially mirroring
interstate variation in per pupil spending.
(Some of the highest amounts in Column C
reflect statutory minimum allocations for
small states.) When these data are adjusted
for geographic differences in educational
costs, the degree of interstate inequality is
slightly reduced but still quite substantial.
The state expenditure factor might be
defensible if it served as a reward or
incentive for higher state spending on
education. But this is implausible for two
reasons. First, Title I aid is too small to
realistically motivate additional state or local
spending; states typically do not spend an
additional dollar just to capture a few extra
pennies. Second, by linking Title I aid to state
per-pupil spending, the state expenditure
factor primarily rewards state fiscal capacity
(i.e., taxable wealth per pupil, shown in
Column A in Table 2), not educational effort
(i.e., willingness to tax that wealth, shown in
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Table 1: Children in Poverty and Title I Allocations, 2003-2004 
(with percentage of national total)   
State A) Poor B) Title I C) Title I 
children allocation allocation per 
poor child
Wyoming 9,796 0.1 $28,964,809 0.3 $2,957
Vermont 9,667 0.1 27,005,035 0.2 2,794
North Dakota 11,245 0.1 30,329,411 0.3 2,697
Massachusetts 112,570 1.3 260,050,569 2.3 2,310
New Hampshire 13,140 0.2 29,733,465 0.3 2,263
Alaska 14,330 0.2 30,431,327 0.3 2,124
Maine 25,025 0.3 47,816,946 0.4 1,911
Delaware 16,038 0.2 30,637,587 0.3 1,910
Connecticut 55,987 0.7 106,557,518 1.0 1,903
New York 638,992 7.6 1,184,751,800 10.7 1,854
New Jersey 155,082 1.9 272,032,782 2.4 1,754
South Dakota 19,125 0.2 32,000,786 0.3 1,673
Michigan 251,533 3.0 420,799,581 3.8 1,673
Pennsylvania 274,088 3.3 438,337,029 3.9 1,599
Rhode Island 27,313 0.3 43,155,247 0.4 1,580
Wisconsin 96,223 1.1 151,746,825 1.4 1,577
Kansas 55,419 0.7 87,046,905 0.8 1,571
Montana 25,827 0.3 40,458,865 0.4 1,567
Ohio 258,749 3.1 399,821,239 3.6 1,545
Minnesota 76,892 0.9 117,728,364 1.1 1,531
Maryland 101,153 1.2 153,983,710 1.4 1,522
West Virginia 63,503 0.8 94,167,837 0.8 1,483
Nebraska 32,413 0.4 46,769,850 0.4 1,443
Illinois 333,173 4.0 478,793,210 4.3 1,437
Hawaii 26,720 0.3 36,094,503 0.3 1,351
Missouri 146,574 1.7 194,886,735 1.8 1,330
California 1,288,493 15.4 1,649,697,459 14.8 1,280
Iowa 49,808 0.6 62,955,699 0.6 1,264
Oregon 93,069 1.1 115,317,070 1.0 1,239
Louisiana 207,871 2.5 256,175,473 2.3 1,232
Virginia 149,256 1.8 182,110,558 1.6 1,220
New Mexico 85,331 1.0 103,273,759 0.9 1,210
Indiana 129,878 1.6 156,540,820 1.4 1,205
Kentucky 138,101 1.6 162,957,050 1.5 1,180
Georgia 292,431 3.5 343,346,663 3.1 1,174
South Carolina 138,465 1.7 157,877,214 1.4 1,140
Washington 138,049 1.6 157,166,797 1.4 1,138
Texas 902,369 10.8 1,018,467,898 9.2 1,129
Mississippi 139,374 1.7 157,215,840 1.4 1,128
Idaho 35,921 0.4 39,875,687 0.4 1,110
Oklahoma 117,122 1.4 128,454,510 1.2 1,097
Tennessee 171,970 2.1 185,694,729 1.7 1,080
Colorado 96,512 1.2 104,115,332 0.9 1,079
Alabama 165,578 2.0 177,362,455 1.6 1,071
North Carolina 248,492 3.0 261,980,283 2.4 1,054
Florida 512,261 6.1 523,834,879 4.7 1,023
Arkansas 105,100 1.3 106,001,974 1.0 1,009
Utah 49,259 0.6 45,809,427 0.4 930
Nevada 59,296 0.7 53,216,311 0.5 897
Arizona 213,295 2.5 187,860,284 1.7 881
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, 2003 (children ages
5 to 17 in poverty); U.S. Department of Education Budget Tables, ESEA Title I Grants to Local
Educational Agencies by State, 2003.
Column B in Table 2). Nonfederal education
revenue is more highly correlated with state
fiscal capacity than with state effort, and
states with higher capacity tend to exert
lower effort. Thus, tying federal aid to state
per pupil spending does not reward effort so
much as it rewards wealth. Indeed, in the
examples above, the wealthier states
(Maryland, Massachusetts, and Minnesota)
exert less effort than the poorer states
(Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico) but
have higher per-pupil spending and thus
receive higher Title I aid per poor child. 
Simply put, the state expenditure factor in
the Title I formula should be eliminated. This
reform would bring Title I into line with the
aid formulas for special education, English
language instruction, and child nutrition, all
of which assign equal weight to eligible
children regardless of the state where they
reside. Title I should simply allocate aid in
proportion to each state’s share of poor
children. Moreover, instead of the state
expenditure factor, Title I should include a
cost factor to adjust for geographic
differences in educational costs. This
approach would lessen interstate inequality
because poor children are disproportionately
concentrated in low-spending states and
because equal federal dollars per eligible
child provide a bigger boost, proportionally
speaking, to low-spending states than to
high-spending states.
Although eliminating the state expenditure
factor in Title I would be a positive step, its
effect on interstate inequality would be
modest. A more serious effort to narrow
interstate inequality requires three main
policy components. First, the federal role in
school finance must be substantially
increased; the federal government cannot buy
much equality when it spends only nine
cents of every education dollar. Second,
because interstate differences in education
funding primarily reflect differences in fiscal
capacity, federal aid should compensate for
differences across states in their ability to
support education. Medicaid provides an
example of federal aid distributed in inverse
proportion to state fiscal capacity. Third, in
aiding states with low education spending,
federal policy should distinguish between
low fiscal capacity and low effort. Where low
spending is due to low effort, the primary
federal role should be to spur states toward
greater effort. Congress could require low-
effort states to gradually increase their effort
up to a minimum threshold as a condition of
receiving significantly expanded federal aid.
These reforms would not be cheap, and
they would require robust political will. But
the problem of interstate inequality is both
glaring and longstanding. If we are serious
about wanting to ensure that every child in
America meets high standards, then we must
develop a federal school finance policy equal
to the task.
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Table 2: State Fiscal Capacity and Educational Effort by State,
2003-2004 (with percent of national average)
A B C
State Total taxable Educational Nonfederal  
resources effort revenue
(per pupil) (per pupil)
Alabama $178,064 89 3.27 93 $5,819 83
Alaska 159,139 80 3.66 104 5,822 83
Arizona 160,354 81 3.12 89 5,003 72
Arkansas 167,832 84 3.53 100 5,929 85
California 168,055 84 3.42 97 5,743 82
Colorado 230,315 116 2.96 84 6,818 98
Connecticut 253,996 128 3.44 98 8,737 125
Delaware 362,954 182 2.24 64 8,130 116
Florida 209,398 105 2.96 84 6,199 89
Georgia 195,964 98 3.80 108 7,453 107
Hawaii 225,548 113 3.82 109 8,627 123
Idaho 157,727 79 3.57 101 5,626 80
Illinois 209,172 105 3.35 95 7,010 100
Indiana 208,503 105 3.96 113 8,264 118
Iowa 224,688 113 3.40 97 7,645 109
Kansas 212,974 107 3.79 108 8,075 116
Kentucky 187,524 94 3.28 93 6,147 88
Louisiana 182,526 92 3.23 92 5,890 84
Maine 187,498 94 4.27 121 8,013 115
Maryland 252,749 127 3.22 91 8,140 116
Massachusetts 234,883 118 3.39 96 7,966 114
Michigan 181,531 91 4.24 120 7,688 110
Minnesota 234,525 118 3.48 99 8,152 117
Mississippi 148,437 75 3.62 103 5,380 77
Missouri 206,812 104 3.30 94 6,823 98
Montana 178,136 90 3.65 104 6,505 93
Nebraska 232,972 117 3.42 97 7,968 114
Nevada 226,288 114 2.81 80 6,362 91
New Hampshire 232,031 117 3.39 96 7,875 113
New Jersey 234,549 118 4.34 123 10,186 146
New Mexico 157,280 79 3.79 108 5,962 85
New York 226,166 114 4.08 116 9,216 132
North Carolina 213,979 108 2.90 82 6,201 89
North Dakota 229,595 115 3.15 89 7,223 103
Ohio 201,149 101 3.92 111 7,890 113
Oklahoma 163,416 82 3.50 100 5,725 82
Oregon 202,845 102 3.43 98 6,966 100
Pennsylvania 216,454 109 3.75 106 8,113 116
Rhode Island 207,837 104 3.62 103 7,534 108
South Carolina 177,184 89 3.81 108 6,746 96
South Dakota 241,334 121 2.72 77 6,557 94
Tennessee 206,282 104 2.61 74 5,388 77
Texas 170,616 86 3.68 105 6,282 90
Utah 146,631 74 3.31 94 4,857 69
Vermont 203,727 102 4.63 131 9,425 135
Virginia 248,386 125 2.95 84 7,340 105
Washington 206,431 104 3.07 87 6,343 91
West Virginia 166,089 83 4.27 121 7,086 101
Wisconsin 217,554 109 3.91 111 8,514 122
Wyoming 263,292 132 3.49 99 9,191 131
Note: “Total taxable resources”
(Column A) is a measure of state
fiscal capacity developed by the
U.S. Department of Treasury; 2003
figures are available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/econ
omic policy/resources/
estimates.shtml. Nonfederal revenue
data (Column C) are from U.S.
Census Bureau, Public Elementary-
Secondary Education Finances:
2003-04 (Table 1). The data in
Columns A and C are cost-adjusted
dollars per weighted pupil. The cost
adjustment applies the state-level
Geographic Cost of Education Index
in Jay G. Chambers, Geographic
Variations in Public Schools’ Costs
(NCES Working Paper No. 98-04,
1998) (table III-3). Pupil weights are
1.9 for students with disabilities, 1.6
for students in poverty, and 1.2 for
English-language learners.
Enrollment data used to derive
weighted pupil counts are from
NCES, Digest of Education Statistics
2005 (Table 33 (Fall 2003 enrollment)
and Table 52 (Children Ages 6 to 21)
served under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, Part B,
2003-04); U.S. Census Bureau, Small
Area Income and Poverty Estimates,
2003 (Children Ages 5 to 17 in
Poverty); and U.S. Department of
Education, National Clearinghouse
for English Language Acquisition
and Language Instruction
Educational Programs, ELL
Demographics by State, 2003-04.
Dividing Column C by Column A
yields the “Educational Effort”
figures in Column B. Across the
states, nonfederal revenue is more
strongly correlated with fiscal
capacity (.62) than with effort (.45).
Further, capacity and effort are
negatively correlated (–.39). With
some exceptions, states with higher
capacity tend to make less effort yet
raise more revenue than states with
lower capacity.
Reprinted by permission:
“How the Federal Government
Makes Rich States Richer, by
Goodwin Liu” The Funding Gaps
2006.  2006: The Education Trust.  
44437GVSU  7/16/07  9:36 AM  Page 10
3
Liu: How the Federal Government Make Rich States Richer
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
